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BELONGING AND EMPOWERMENT: 
A NEW "CIVIL RIGHTS" PARADIGM 
BASED ON LESSONS OF THE PAST 
THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS. By Risa L. 
GolubofC Harvard University Press. 2007. Pp. viii + 376. 
$35.00. 
Rebecca E. Zietlow2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When I was a legal services lawyer on the South Side of 
Chicago, my colleagues engaged in an ongoing debate over 
whether race discrimination cases fit within our mandate to prac-
tice "poverty law." On the one hand, race discrimination was a 
barrier to the ability of some of our clients to find good jobs and 
work their way out of poverty. On the other hand, race discrimi-
nation cases did not directly redress the poverty of our clients. 
Clients "lucky" enough to have a job where they experienced 
discrimination arguably needed our help less than those who de-
pended on public benefits. Our thinking reflected the Court's in-
terpretation of the equal protection clause which disaggregates 
the relationship between race and class. The Supreme Court's 
equal protection jurisprudence did little to help my African 
American clients on the South Side of Chicago. Even though the 
primary problem of our clients was poverty, race discrimination 
provided the only framework of anti-discrimination law to meet 
their needs. The Supreme Court long ago found that economic 
classifications do not trigger "heightened scrutiny" for equal pro-
tection analysis'- only race-based classifications get heightened 
1. Associate Professor of Law. University of Virginia. 
2. Charles W. Fornoff Professor of Law and Values. University of Toledo College 
of Law. Thanks to Michele Adams and W. David Koeninger for their helpful comments 
on earlier drafts. Thanks to Brianna White for her excellent research assistance. and to 
the University of Toledo College of Law for funding my research. 
3. See Dandridge v. Williams. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
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scrutiny. Moreover. many statutes protect against race discrimi-
nation, but virtually none protect against discrimination on the 
basis of poverty! Yet it was rarely possible for us to show that 
our client's _legal troubles were caused by intentional race dis-
crimination.' Our poor, Black clients needed a new formulation 
of their rights. which would take into account the confluence of 
race and class that limited their ability to improve their lives, and 
create positive measures to remedy it. 
Despite the advances that African Americans have made in 
our country as a result of the Civil Rights movement of the 
1960s, poverty stubbornly persists in communities of color 
throughout our country. More than 50 years after Brown v. 
Board of Education" and 40 years after the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act,' people of color are still lagging behind whites in virtually 
every indicator of economic success. H Yet our race discrimination 
law is simply unable to address that frustrating phenomenon. In 
Brown. the Court established a paradigm by holding that racial 
segregation violates the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. As a result of Brown and its progeny, a per-
son has the right to be free from arbitrary and discriminatory 
treatment based on prejudice against that person's immutable 
characteristics. However, the Brown paradigm fails to account 
for the inter-relationship of race and class in the subordination 
of people of color in our society. At the dawn of the twenty-first 
century, we need a new way of thinking about civil rights. We 
-1. For example. the regulations governing federal Section 8 housing subsidy 
vouchers prohibit discrimination on the basis of ··race. color. religion. sex. national ori-
gin. familial status or disabilitv .. but not level of income. 2-1 C.F.R. 982.304 (2008). In-
;tead. the regulations put the. burden on the tenant to locate a "'willing .. landlord. 2-1 
C.F.R. 982.302 (2008). When I practiced law in Chicago. my clients with Section 8 certifi-
cates often had difficulty locating a landlord willing to rent to them and accept their cer-
tificate. 
5. It is arguable that societal race discrimination. and even indirect intentional dis-
crimination by the government. caused our clients' predicament. See NICHOLAS 
LP,IA~N. THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND HOW IT 
CHANGED A\IERICA 89-95 (1991). However. the Court has repeatedly held that general 
allegations of societal discrimination. without more. do not establish a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g .. Washington v. Davis. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In addition. 
the Court has held that remedying general societal race discrimination does not justify 
affirmative action programs that classify on the basis of race. See Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke. -138 U.S. 265 (1978). 
6. Brown v. Board of Educ .. 347 U.S. 483 (195-1). 
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pub. L. 88-352. July 2. 196-1. 78 Stat. 241. codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (199-1). 
8. For example. in 2004. Black households had a median income of $30.134. while 
overall median income was $4-1.389. http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/ 
archives/income_ wealth/005647 .html. 
2008] BOOK REVIEWS 355 
need to move beyond the paradigm of equal treatment and to-
wards a paradigm of more substantive equality rooted in the 
principle of anti-subordination. 
Instead of formal equality, a good starting point for re-
thinking civil rights is the concept of "belonging."9 Rights of be-
longing are those rights that promote an inclusive vision of who 
belongs to the national community of the United States and that 
facilitate equal membership in that community. 10 Rights of be-
longing include economic rights because in order to fully belong 
in our society, people need more than simply the freedom from 
intentionally discriminatory treatment. They also need economic 
empowerment. 11 Risa Goluboff's recent book, The Lost Promise 
of Civil Rights, gives us a glimpse of what civil rights law would 
look like without the disaggregation of race and class, and pro-
vides a great background for understanding rights of belonging. 
In the book, Goluboff describes another tradition of civil rights 
from our history, based not in the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment but instead in the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's promise of economic empowerment. Goluboff's lessons 
from the past can help us to re-envision civil rights law for the 
future by providing a basis for a fuller understanding of rights of 
belonging. 
In The Lost Promise, Goluboff provides three valuable con-
tributions for anyone who teaches, studies, or has any interest in 
constitutional law and anti-discrimination law. First, she helps us 
to understand how the meaning of civil rights developed into 
what we understand today as civil rights, and details an alterna-
tive approach that was abandoned by the attorneys who litigated 
early civil rights cases. Thus, her second contribution is that she 
reminds us that the current paradigm is not the only way to think 
about equality law. Finally, and most importantly, she provides 
an eye-opening framework for re-thinking equality law to ad-
dress more effectively the problems in our society today. In that 
framework, economic rights are paramount because the subor-
dination of people of color in our society has never been just 
9. See REBECCA E. ZIETLOW. ENFORCING EQUALITY CONGRESS. THE 
CONSTITUTION. AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 6--7 (2006). 
10. The concept of '"belonging'" has its roots in the Reconstruction Era theorv of 
citizenship rights and is inspired by the work of Professor Kenneth Karst. See ~.g .. 
KENNETH KARST. BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQL'AL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITt.:TIOl'i ( 1989). ZIETLOW. supra note 9. at 6--7. 
II. Civil rights leader Martin Luther King recognized the importance of economic 
rights to in our society. and spent the last years of his life campaigning for those rights. 
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about race. Rather, racism has been used as a means to further 
the economic exploitation of workers. 
The Lost Promise has already received recognition as a 
ground-breaking work of legal history. 12 Goluboff's innovative 
work goes beyond other historical works on the civil rights 
movement because she not only explores the connection be-
tween the labor movement of the early twentieth century and 
the civil rights movement of the later twentieth century, but also 
examines the doctrinal connections between the two move-
ments. 13 Her detailed description of the development of constitu-
tional doctrine warrants the same recognition by constitutional 
scholars and theorists. For too long, constitutional theorists have 
also disaggregated the relationship of race and class when theo-
rizing constitutional principles of equality. Informed by 
Goluboff's work, the theory of rights of belonging synthesizes 
racial equality and economic rights in order to effectively com-
bat the subordination of all workers in our society. 
II. THE BROWN PARADIGM AND THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE 
The equal protection clause is triggered when laws divide 
people into categories and treat categories of people differently. 
As any student of constitutional law knows, the Court first iden-
tified racial classifications as those that might warrant height-
ened scrutiny in Justice Stone's footnote four of U.S. v. Carolene 
Products 1 ~ and reaffirmed that commitment in the case of Kore-
matsu v. U.S. 1; In Brown, the Court overturned the 1896 case of 
Plessy v. Ferguson 16 and held that contrary to its ruling in Plessy, 
"separate'' could never be "equal." 17 Since Brown, the Court has 
applied strict scrutiny to race-based classifications, striking down 
12. For example. the book recently received the 2008 Willard Hurst award given by 
the Law and Society Association for the best legal history book written in 2007. 
13. Bv comparison. in her book. TO STAND AND TO FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS IN POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY (2003). historian Martha Biondi explains 
how the northern civil rights movement grew out of the labor movement. but she does 
not discuss the legal theories employed by lawyers who worked with the movement. In 
his book. FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRuGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). legal historian Michael Klarman examines 
the development of race discrimination law throughout the first half of twentieth century, 
but he does not discuss the labor movement. 
14. U.S. v. Carolene Products. 304 U.S. 144. 152 n.4 (1938). 
15. Korematsu v. U.S .. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
16. Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
17. Brown. 347 U.S. at 495. 
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virtually every such classification, including laws requiring segre-
gation in all government facilities1x and those outlawing inter-
racial marriage.1y Thanks to the Brown paradigm, African 
Americans enjoy a constitutional right against government dis-
crimination on the basis of race. By ending our racial caste sys-
tem, Brown and its political companion, the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, affirmed a fundamental human right. 
The Brown paradigm has its weaknesses, however. The 
Court has severely limited the scope of the equal protection 
clause by holding that it does not apply to private actors20 and 
requiring a showing of discriminatory intent to trigger height-
ened scrutiny. 21 These holdings have greatly limited the potential 
of the equal protection clause to combat race discrimination. 
Moreover, as Equal Protection law has developed, it has devel-
oped doctrinal weaknesses. The concept of equal protection re-
quires the comparison of identical groups of people. To over-
simplify, only "likes" need be treated "alike." Determining 
whether groups of people are alike or different can cause uncer-
tainty. 
This uncertainty is most apparent in the Court's treatment 
of the two principle "suspect classifications" that it has identi-
fied, those based on race and those on gender. When the law 
categorizes on the basis of race, treating the white majority dif-
ferently from racial minorities, courts must consider whether 
whites and members of minority groups are alike. On the one 
hand, people are people, and the law correctly assumes that 
there are few if any inherent differences based on the color of 
one's skin.22 Race is a social construct, not a biological differ-
ence.23 However, centuries of racial discrimination and racial 
subordination have left their mark on our society, and on people 
of color in our society. Although there are few if any biological 
differences between Blacks and whites, it is hard to say that 
Blacks and whites are really equal in terms of the opportunities 
18. See. e.g, Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson. 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (addressing 
beaches): Gayle v. Browder. 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (addressing buses): Holmes v. Atlanta. 
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (addressing golf courses): New Orleans City Park Improvement 
Ass'n v. Detiege. 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (addressing parks): See also KENNETH L. KARST. 
BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL C!TIZE'\SHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 80 ( 1989). 
19. Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
20. The Civil Rights Cases. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
21. Washington v. Davis. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
22. See William M. Richman. Genetic Residues of Ancient Migrations: An End to 
Biological Essentialism and the Reification of Race. 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 387 (2006). 
23. See IAN HANEY-L6PEZ. WHITE BY LAW (1996). 
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that they face, even in the twenty-first century. Given that there 
is significant evidence that whites and Blacks are not equal in 
terms of opportunities and resources, are they really alike? Or, is 
a person's race sufficiently predictive of one's economic and so-
cial success that people of color and whites really are not alike, 
and differential treatment is justified, at least when that treat-
ment is geared towards improving the opportunities and re-
sources of people of color? 
Currently, the Court has adopted the stance that whites and 
racial minorities are sufficiently alike that virtually any differen-
tial treatment violates the principles of equality. As Justice 
Scalia announced in his concurrence to Adarand, "In the eyes of 
our government, we are just one race here. It is American ... "24 
Because this view fails to account for the historic subordination 
of people of color in our society. the race blind approach to race 
based categories hampers the ability of racial minorities to ob-
tain equality. The United States Supreme Court has applied this 
approach to strike down affirmative action measures intended to 
benefit racial minorities.2" Thus, the current Supreme Court's 
approach significantly hampers the attempts of people of color 
to use the political process to obtain substantive equality. 
Treating "likes" alike and different people differently is also 
problematic in the area of gender discrimination law. While men 
and women are equal in abilities in many contexts, there are bio-
logical differences between men and women that simply do not 
fit into the ·'equal treatment" paradigm. The Supreme Court has 
been inconsistent when determining which differences are "real" 
and which are outdated stereotypes. For example, the Court has 
found that pregnancy is not a gender related condition justifying 
differential treatment,26 but the capacity to get pregnant is such a 
condition.27 Not surprisingly, the equal treatment paradigm has 
brought about limited economic progress for women. The "gen-
der gap'' between wages earned by men and women for compa-
rable work persists, and is virtually identical to that in the early 
1970s, when the Court first recognized gender as a protected 
class."~ Thus, gender discrimination law is also an ineffective so-
lution for the inequality experienced by women of color. 
24. Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena. 515 U.S. 200.239 (1995). 
25. See. e.g .. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co .. 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Gratz v. 
Bollinger. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
26. Geduldig v. Aiello. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
27. Michael M. v. Superor Ct. of Sonoma Cty .. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
28. http://usgovinfo.about.cornlod/censusandstatistics/a/paygapgrows.htm. Moreover. 
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One solution that scholars have offered to the sameness-
difference dilemma is to replace the equal treatment model with 
an "anti-subordination" model.'~ Under the anti-subordination 
approach, courts would evaluate categories differentiating peo-
ple, not based on whether or not they treat people equally. but 
on whether the cat_egory empowers or su?ordinates a group, of 
people that have htstoncally been subordmated by the law. In 
the context of race, courts would strike down laws that subordi-
nate people of color and uphold laws that empower them. In the 
context of gender, courts would strike down laws that subordi-
nate women and uphold laws that empower them.11 Like the 
equal treatment model. the anti-subordination model has roots 
in the Brown decision.'' In Brown. the Court emphasized the 
subordinating impact of racial segregation on African American 
children.'' "Separate but equal" could never be truly equal in 
public education because race-based categories had been used to 
there is ample evidence that the equal treatment model has hurt women economically. A 
number of scholars have noted that at least in the context of family law. gender neutrality 
has a harmful impact on women. See. e.g .. MARTHA ALBERTSO:-.: FINEMA~. THE 
ILLuSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 180-85 
(1991 ): David L. Chambers. Rethinking the Substalllive Rules for Custody Disputes in Di-
vorce. 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (19S5). Lower courts have held that sex-custody presump-
tions are unconstitutional. and they have widely been replaced by the gender neutral 
"best interests of the child" test. See Katherine T. Bartlett. Preference, Presumption. Pre-
disposition, and Common Sense: From Traditional Custody Doctrines to the American 
Law lnstitllle's Family Dissollllion Project. 36 FAM. L. Q. II. 11-17 (2002). As a result. 
women often bargain for custody. accepting lesser economic compensation in exchange 
for their husbands' agreement not to contest custody. FI~EMA:-.:. supra at 180-S5. Even 
though a significantly higher percentage of married women with children work outside 
the home than did so forty years ago. women continue to suffer economically after di-
vorce. Divorced mothers overwhelmingly experience a decrease in income while their ex-
husbands tend to experience an increase in income. after their divorce. See Suzanne M. 
Bianchi et al.. The Gender Gap in the Economic Well-Being of Non-resident Fathers and 
Custodial Mothers. 36 DEMOGRAPHY 195. 197 (Mav 1999). 
29. See CATHARINE MACKI~:-.10:-.:. TOWARD.A FEMI~IST THEORY OF THE STATE 
(1989): Ruth Calker. Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection. 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (19S6): Victor C. Romero. Are Filipinas Asian or Latinas? Reclaim-
ing the Anti-Subordination Objective of Equal Protection After Grutter and Gratz. 7 U. 
PA. J. CONST L. 765 (2005). 
30. Calker. supra note 29. at 1008. 
31. Justice Ginsburg hinted at such an approach to gender based classifications in 
U.S. v. Virginia. 518 U.S. 515. 555 (1996). See Denise C. Morgan. Anti-Subordination 
Analysis Ajier United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single 
Sex Public Schools. 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 3Sl. 
32. See Reva B. Siegel. Equalit1· Talk: Antisubordination and Amic/assification Val-
ues in Constillltional Struggles 01-er Brown. 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) .. 
33. Brown v. Board of Educ .. 347 U.S. 483. 494 (1954) (Stating. "To separate (Black 
children) from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race gener-
ates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the communitv that mav affect their hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."). · · 
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subordinate African Americans. 34 This reasoning suggests that 
racial segregation was unconstitutional, not because it treated 
Blacks and whites differently, but because its purpose was to 
subordinate African Americans. 
The anti-subordination model is appealing because it goes 
beyond a formalist approach to equality and attempts to get at 
the root cause of inequality by focusing on the effect of legal 
categories. The problem with the anti-subordination approach is 
that it has a somewhat awkward fit with the equal protection 
clause and with the American ideal of equality. To many, the 
anti-subordination approach is not equal because it requires 
"special" treatment. In its affirmative action jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court has rejected this model in race discrimination 
law precisely because of this asymmetry. 
The Court's rejection of the anti-subordination model re-
flects another weakness of that model-its subjectivity. Anti-
subordination fits awkwardly into equal protection law, which 
values neutral principles like facial equality. The anti-
subordination model requires judges to make value judgments 
about whether a category is subordinating or not. Reasonable 
people can and often do differ about whether a race or gender 
based category is subordinating. For example, while proponents 
of affirmative action measures to remedy race discrimination ar-
gue that such measures are needed to undo race-based subordi-
nation, opp<;me~ts of affirmative action ~rg~e t~at_ a~y rac_e 
based classtftcatiOns further a system of ractal mfenonty. Femi-
nists often differ over whether gender based classifications are 
justified as anti-subordination measures, or whether they simply 
perpetuate outdated stereotypes about women's interests and 
capabilities. For example, prominent feminists have taken op-
posing positions over the constitutionality of public single sex 
education and the questions of whether employers may provide 
health benefits for maternity leave when they do not provide 
benefits for the comparable health concerns of men.36 These de-
34. !d. at 495. 
35. Justice Clarence Thomas is one of the best known. and most influential, people 
to make such an argument; see. e.g .. Grutter v. Bollinger. 539 U.S. 206. 350 (2003) 
(Thomas. J .. dissenting). 
36. See Wendy W. Williams. The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, 
Courts, and Feminism. 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175. 191. 195-96 (1982). The debate it-
self exposes the problem of equal protection and gender. Is there really any condition 
experienced by men that is comparable to pregnancy? There is a strong argument that no 
such condition exists. 
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bates, often heated, expose more problems inherent in applying 
the Brown paradigm. 
However, perhaps the worst flaw of the Brown paradigm is 
that its failure to address the intersection of race and class belies 
the continued correlation between race and class in our society. 
The neighborhood in which I practiced law, once known as 
"Bronzeville,"17 aptly illustrates the historical intersection be-
tween race and class. During the middle of the twentieth century 
the area was a thriving community full of jazz clubs, theaters and 
other cultural centers, home of celebrities like Joe Louis and 
Mahalia Jackson.3H Wealthy Blacks lived in the crowded 
neighborhood of Bronzeville because segregation prevented 
them from moving to more upscale neighborhoods.w After the 
success of the civil rights movement, those folks could and did 
move to the suburbs and other tonier locations. While I was 
practicing law there in the early 1990s, the former Bronzeville 
was still virtually 100% African American, but it had become 
one of the poorest neighborhoods in the country.4" Residents of 
Bronzeville were unable to leave the neighborhood, not because 
of race discrimination per se, but because they could not afford 
to move.4 ' 
Now I live in Toledo, Ohio, the location of the Auto-Lite 
strike of 1934, a momentous event in labor history which served 
as a catalyst for congressional passage of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, establishing a statutory right to join a union and en-
gage in collective bargaining.42 In Toledo today, numerous work-
ers of all races have lost their well-paying, union-protected 
factory jobs with health benefits and must instead work in low 
paying service sector jobs without any job security or health in-
37. Recently. gentrification has reached the northern edge of Bronzeville and real 
estate developers have revived the term. See David Roeder. Bronzeville 'land grab'; 
Residents say they just want area to 'maintain its mixed-income character.· CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES. May 8. 2008. at 43. 
38. See ALAN EHRENHALT. THE LOST CiTY: DISCOVERING THE FORGOITEN 
VIRTUES OF COMMUNITY IN THE CHICAGO OF THE 1950S at 153-54(1995): LEMANN. 
supra note 5. at 64. 
39. LEMANN. supra note 5. at 64. 
40. EHRENHALT. supra note 38. at 261-62. 
41. In recent years. the South Loop development has spread to the northern edge 
of "Bronzeville" and development has revived the economy of the neighborhood. How-
ever. my former clients now face another dilemma-being driven out of the neighbor-
hood by higher real estate prices. See Roeder. Sllpra note 37. 
42. See Rebecca E. Zietlow & James Gray Pope. The Auto-Lite Strike and the Fight 
Against "Wage Slavery." 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 839 (2007). 
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surance. The Brown paradigm does nothing to help those work-
ers either, including those who are people of color. 
There have been attempts by lawyers and political actors to 
combat both racial and economic subordination since the 1930s. 
The most important such attempt was Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. which outlawed race and gender discrimina-
tion in employment.43 Labor leaders and civil rights leaders 
joined together to fight for that protection, and their alliance was 
crucial to the measure's success.44 Title VII was intended not 
only to end race and gender discrimination, but also to empower 
people of color economically by removing race and gender based 
barriers to their economic success. 
The Warren Court also occasionally recognized the link be-
tween race and poverty. For example, in Harper v. Virginia, the 
Court outlawed the use of poll taxes in state elections, in an 
opinion that implicitly recognized the fact that those taxes had 
historically been used, not only to discriminate on the basis of 
wealth. but also (and more often) to deny the franchise to Afri-
can American voters.4' Similarly, in King v. Smith. the Court 
struck down an Alabama law which prohibited welfare recipients 
from "co-habiting" with a male companion because it was incon-
sistent with federal regulations governing Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children.4" The Court held that local welfare admin-
istrators were required to follow federal regulations.47 Limiting 
the discretion of local caseworkers was not just a matter of eco-
nomic justice, but also of racial justice. Not coincidentally, the 
case originated in Alabama, where white welfare administrators 
had been using the "spouse in the house" visits to harass African 
American women receiving welfare benefits.4K The Court's King 
opinion implicitly recognized the fact that many people in south-
ern states deeply resented the fact that African American 
women were eligible for welfare. The availability of welfare had 
an inflationary impact on the wages of low skill workers because 
it provided an alternative to agricultural and domestic work. 
43. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pub. L. 88-352. July 2. 1964.78 Stat. 241. codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000etseq. (1994). 
44. See ZIETLOW. supra note 9. at 118. 
45. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The 24th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from leveling poll taxes in federal 
elections. U.S. CONST. Amend. XXIV. 
46. King v. Smith. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
47. /d. 
48. See MARTHA F. DAVIS. BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVE\IENT ( 1993). 
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Thus, the availability of welfare undermined the system of eco-
nomic subordination that Goluboff describes so eloquently in 
her book. 
Since then, however, racial and economic subordination 
have been disaggregated in our anti-discrimination law. For ex-
ample, poverty lawyers attempted to follow the Brown model 
and convince the Court that poverty was a suspect class warrant-
ing heightened scrutiny. They were unsuccessful, and in Dan-
dridge v. Williams the Court stated emphatically that all eco-
nomic classifications are subject to deferential rational basis 
review, even if they harm poor people.•" The Dandridge Court 
did not even consider the correlation between race and poverty 
in our society. The Dandridge opinion enables discrimination on 
the basis of wealth to serve as a proxy for race discrimination. 
For example, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp., the Court found that the decision 
of the virtually all-white Village of Arlington Heights to require 
single family housing and reject a zoning variance for builders of 
low income housing was permissible because it was constitution-
ally permissible for the Village to maintain its single family mid-
dle class identity.50 The Court found that the history of racial seg-
regation in Arlington Heights was irrelevant because there was 
no evidence that the decision being challenged was based on 
race discrimination.' 1 
Ironically. the low level of scrutiny for economic based clas-
sifications makes possible one of the few legal measures avail-
able for the empowerment of African Americans. While the 
Court has repeatedly struck down race based affirmative action 
measures, it has also repeatedly noted that affirmative action 
measures for economically disadvantaged students are constitu-
tionally permissible.52 Because students of color are statistically 
so much more likely than white students to be economically dis-
advantaged, such programs should disproportionately benefit 
those students. Thus, economic affirmative action has become a 
safe way for universities to attempt to diversify their student 
bodies. The Supreme Court has also spoken approvingly of di-
versity measures such as the Florida 10% program, which guar-
49. Dandridge v. Williams. 397 U.S. 471 ( 1970). 
50. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Develop. Corp .. 429 U.S. 252 
(1977). 
51. !d. 
52. See. e.g .. Gratz v. Bollinger. 539 U.S. 244. 297 (2003 ). 
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antees the top 10% of every graduating high school class a spot 
in a state university." 
Court approval of these remedies is ironic. The irony of the 
first measure is that its very success at achieving racial diversity 
depends on the failure of African Americans to achieve eco-
nomic success. The irony of the second measure is that its suc-
cess depends on the continued racial segregation of Florida high 
schools. A country whose economic success has depended on 
centuries of unpaid and underpaid work of African American 
workers should be able to better provide for the sons and daugh-
ters of those workers. 
III. THE LOST PROMISE 
In The Lost Promise, Risa Goluboff shows that the disag-
gregation of race and class was not inevitable in our civil rights 
law. From the founding of the NAACP in 1909 and the Civil 
Rights Section of the Department of Justice ("CRS") in 1939 
through the Supreme Court's decision in Brown,'4 Goluboff de-
tails the development of civil rights law during the early years of 
civil rights practice, and describes another way of thinking about 
civil rights, lost until now, that integrates race and class in a dy-
namic fashion. Goluboff reminds us that throughout our nation's 
history, African Americans have suffered not only from racial 
subordination, but also economic subordination. While slavery is 
the most obvious example of exploitation of labor facilitated by 
racial subordination, Goluboff describes in great detail the ex-
tent to which such exploitation continued under the Jim Crow 
system that dominated the south for nearly a century after the 
Civil War ended. 
Goluboff paints a vivid picture of the lives of these workers 
based primarily on letters of complaint that they wrote to 
NAACP and CRS lawyers in the 1930s and 1940s. Those poign-
ant letters reveal how in the south, racial segregation facilitated 
the economic subordination of southern Black workers and 
made it possible for rural employers to treat their workers as vir-
tual slaves (pp. 52-80). When those workers moved north for a 
better life, they encountered less brutal but equally pervasive 
segregation that also limited their economic opportunities (pp. 
53. See Gratz. 539 U.S. at 297 (2003) (suggesting the Florida 10% plan as an alter-
native means of obtaining racial diversity). 
54. 347 U.S. -183 (1954). 
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81-110). Thus, both northern and southern African American 
workers described the ways in which race discrimination and ra-
cial subordination limited their economic opportunities. How-
ever, the primary concern of those workers was not race dis-
crimination, but lack of economic opportunity (pp. 80, 85). 
In the rural south, the Jim Crow system treated Blacks as 
second class citizens in every facet of their life, and kept their la-
bor cheap by law and brutal force. Black sharecroppers lived in a 
"world of white economic domination and black economic de-
pendence" (p. 80), a world which many found impossible to 
leave behind. Meanwhile, in the industrial north, "For some Af-
rican American workers, then, economic opportunity meant the 
end of segregation. For others, it meant a willingness to accept 
segregation (at least in the short term) in exchange for economic 
survival and advancement" (p. 160). Thus, lawyers presented 
with these workers' complaints had to try to find a legal strategy 
to remedy both economic disempowerment and race discrimina-
tion (p. 13). 
Under the Brown paradigm, it is axiomatic that the most 
promising strategy to address the problems of African American 
workers is to sue their employers for race discrimination. How-
ever, in the 1930s, the predominance of race over economic in-
jury was far from obvious. Not only was Plessy still the law of the 
land, but as Goluboff explains, in the 1930s individual rights 
claims were most often framed not as race based civil rights, but 
as class based economic rights. Until the mid-1930s, the Court 
had found an individual "right to contract" in cases such as 
Lochner v. New Yore (p. 25). As a result of the New Deal, the 
Court abandoned Lochner, but many contemporary scholars and 
practitioners believed that other economic rights would take the 
place of the right to contract (p. 26). Unions were politically 
powerful, as was their claim that the right to organize was a fun-
damental right. Thus, ''the most likely replacement for the indi-
vidual contract rights the Supreme Court had previously pro-
tected seemed to be new collective labor and economic rights" 
(p. 17). 
As the lawyers in the Civil Rights Section of the Depart-
ment of Justice began to theorize a way to attack the oppressive 
system of Jim Crow, their paradigm was the economic and labor 
rights that had been central to the New Deal program of Presi-
55. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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dent Franklin Roosevelt and his political allies (pp. 27-29). 
Those lawyers developed a litigation strategy directly attacking 
the economic exploitation of southern Black workers. While the 
New Deal had largely excluded Black workers by excluding agri-
cultural and domestic workers from its protections, the CRS 
lawyers added an element of race equality to workers rights and 
attempted to extend those protections to those workers (p. 172). 
Thus, they started from the framework of economic rights and 
used those rights creatively to further the case of racial equality. 
While Brown was based on the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. the CRS lawyers relied instead on 
the Thirteenth Amendment and Reconstruction Era anti-
peonage statutes based on Congress' power to enforce the Thir-
teenth Amendment (p. 114). The Thirteenth Amendment, which 
outlaws slavery and involuntary servitude, was a natural source 
for the CRS attorneys, who invoked the spirit of Reconstruction 
as they sought to expand the meaning of that Amendment and 
the Reconstruction era civil rights statutes based on Congress' 
power to enforce it (p. 135). Members of the Reconstruction 
Congress understood the connection between racial subordina-
tion and economic oppression and they intended the Thirteenth 
Amendment to serve as a tool for the empowerment. not just for 
former slaves, but also for workers in general (p. 18)."" Aboli-
tionists such as James Wilson emphasized the depressing effect 
that slavery had on the wages of free workers, and the conditions 
in which they worked. They argued that the abolition of slavery 
would help all workers, white or Black, because "free labor was 
not just the absence of slavery and its vestiges; it was the guaran-
tee of an affirmative state of labor autonomy. "57 
After Reconstruction, members of the nascent American 
labor movement nurtured this broad construction of the Thir-
teenth Amendment's Labor leaders came to believe that work-
ing without the right to organize in a union was akin to slavery. 
They argued that workers had a constitutional right to organize, 
embodied in the First and Thirteenth Amendments.59 Through 
56. See also Lea VanderVelde. The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment. 138 
U. PA. L REV. 437. 438 (1989). 
57. /d. at 438. 
58. See James Gray Pope. Labors Constiwtion of Freedom. 106 YALE L.J. 941 
(1997). 
59. See James Gray Pope. The Thirteenth Amendment versus the Commerce Clause: 
Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, /921-1957. 102 COLUM. L REV. 
l (2002). 
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the late 1930s, union leaders invoked the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and the fight against wage slavery as they lobbied for the 
National Labor Relations Act and other protective labor legisla-
tion."'' Members of the New Deal Congress were influenced by 
this campaign. Members of Congress also invoked the Thir-
teenth Amendment and the fight against wage slavery as they 
spoke in favor of the NLRA during congressional debates."1 Up-
holding the NLRA in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, the Supreme 
Court referred to the right to organize as a fundamental right.6c 
The CRS attorneys reflected the influence of this political 
context as they embarked on their campaign to help African 
American workers. The CRS was founded by Attorney General 
Frank Murphy, the pro-labor former governor of Michigan (p. 
111 ). Attorney General Francis Biddle, who had previously 
served as chair of the National Labor Relations Board, led the 
CRS during its most formative years of 1941-1945 (p. 125). Thus, 
the CRS had a strong pro-labor bent and championed workers' 
rights. The workers whom they represented were primarily agri-
cultural and domestic workers who did not enjoy a right to or-
ganize into a union because they had been excluded from NLRA 
coverage (pp. 126-27). The CRS relied on the Thirteenth 
Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude and anti-
peonage statutes to litigate against unscrupulous farmers who 
abused their sharecroppers and tenant farmers (pp. 136-40, 142-
43). Eventually, the CRS also represented domestic workers who 
were virtually confined to the homes of their employers (pp. 
162-64). 
The CRS attorneys' ultimate goal was also significantly dif-
ferent from that of the Brown paradigm. In Brown, the Court 
ruled against state discrimination and established the negative 
right of freedom from discrimination (p. 218). In contrast, the 
CRS attorneys sought to establish affirmative duties on the part 
of the government. They hoped to create a constitutional right to 
work for fair wages and under decent conditions (pp. 151-52). 
CRS lawyers argued that the United States government had an 
affirmative obligation to provide this right, which they described 
as "the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of person and property" (p. 152). 
60. See ZIETLOW. supra note 9. at 65-70. 
61. /d. at 75-80. 
62. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co .. 301 U.S. I. 33 (1937). 
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The story of the CRS attorneys is only one of two narratives 
in The Lost Promise. Goluboff also describes the legal strategy 
of the NAACP legal department during the same time period. 
Leaders of the NAACP had early on determined that their mis-
sion would focus on racial, not economic, equality (p. 176). In 
the 1940s, NAACP lawyers led by Thurgood Marshall took on 
the cause of industrial workers suffering from the racial dis-
crimination of both employers and unions (p. 180). Because 
there were few anti-discrimination statutes, the NAACP lawyers 
tried to whittle away at the state action requirement of the Equal 
Protection Clause (p. 200). The NAACP lawyers also attempted 
to establish a right to work free of race discrimination, a theory 
that relied on Lochner Era state court precedents upholding a 
substantive right "to pursue one's calling" (pp. 206-08). These 
theories enjoyed some success in lower courts (p. 212). However, 
by the mid-1940s, the NAACP lawyers began to move away 
from their workers' rights cases and focus predominantly on 
education as a vehicle to overturn Plessy v. Fergusson (p. 218)."' 
Their efforts culminated in the 1954 victory in Brown (p. 240). 
Thus, the NAACP attorneys veered away from economic 
justice as one of their goals, and eventually wholeheartedly 
adopted the more middle class concern about racial segregation 
as the Legal Defense Fund established a separate identity from 
the main organization (p. 13). As Goluboff points out, the LDF 
lawyers faced opposition from many sides, including Republi-
cans, southern Democrats, and anti-Communists (p. 217). 
Goluboff explains that those attorneys took the road that they 
believed would be the most effective, and the most politically 
palatable at the time. Nonetheless, it is clear that Goluboff sees 
this decision as a betrayal of the workers whom the NAACP at-
torneys represented during the pro-labor days of the 1940s. 
Ironically, one of the reasons why the LDF reduced its labor 
strategy was because the NAACP sought to form more alliances 
with unions as a liberal front during the anti-Communist 
63. Sophia Z. Lee disagrees with Goluboff on this point. See Sophia Z. Lee. Hot-
spots in a Cold War: The NAACP's Postwar Workplace Constitlltionalism. 1948-1964. 26 
LAw & HIST. REV. 327 (2008). Lee points out that even while Thurgood Marshall fo-
cused on the campaign to end Plessy. local branch lawyers continued to argue that unions 
were state actors before administrative agencies. /d. at 332. In 1964. those lawyers 
achieved a major victory in the form of an NLRB ruling holding that the NLRB could 
not certify a union that discriminated on the basis of race. The NLRB relied on Shelley v. 
Kramer. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). to hold that the Board's certification met the state action re-
quirement of the Equal Protection Clause. Lee, at 336 (citing Hughes Tool. 147 NLRB 
1573 (1964 ). 
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McCarthy Era, and thus stopped suing unions for race discrimi-
nation (pp. 217-37). Nonetheless, it is clear that Goluboff sees 
this 1950 decision as a turning point away from an approach to 
civil rights that would have more directly helped African Ameri-
can workers, the primary reason why the "promise" was "lost." 
Goluboff provides less information about the evolution of 
the CRS legal strategy, probably because it mostly occurred after 
the time period covered by the book. I would love to know more 
about the decline of the anti-peonage strategy. Also omitted 
from Goluboff's story is the alliance of labor with the civil rights 
movement in the early 1960s, and their joint success in the 1964 
Civil Rights Act. Nonetheless, it is apparent that political forces 
influenced the turn of the CRS lawyers away from economic 
empowerment and towards anti-segregation, just as it had with 
their LDF colleagues. Those forces included the anti-
Communism of the McCarthy era, which threatened those dar-
ing enough to espouse class-consciousness, and the rise of the 
civil rights movement, which emphasized racial segregation over 
overtly economic issues (pp. 256-58). 
Goluboff ends her book by evaluating the impact of Brown 
on contemporary legal thought. It really is difficult to exaggerate 
the impact of Brown on current constitutional doctrine and 
equality law. As Goluboff explains, Brown established "the legal 
and intellectual framework that continues to dominate how law-
yers and laypeople alike think about civil rights." (p. 240). In 
that framework, the prototypical plaintiff is not the worker seek-
ing economic rights, but the child seeking to combat the social 
stigma of racial segregation. "Enshrined in constitutional law, 
then, was Brown's image of a Jim Crow that had as its central 
harm the psychological injury of inferiority." (p. 244). According 
to Goluboff, the gravitational pull of Brown eventually ended 
civil rights lawyers' experimentation with economic-based civil 
rights. As she explains, the image of Jim Crow in the Brown 
opinion "divorced the seventy-five-year-old caste system from its 
economic roots, or its material inequalities, from the farm work-
ers who complained about immobility and the industrial workers 
who complained about their inability to make a living." (p. 251 ). 
As a result, ''the new civil rights would prove fundamentally un-
able to redress the economic hierarchies of Jim Crow America." 
(p. 244). 
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IV. RIGHTS OF BELONGING AND ECONOMIC 
EMPOWERMENT 
In the twenty-first century. it is apparent that facial equality 
alone is not sufficient to remedy the centuries of economic and 
race-based subordination of people of color in our society. In 
order to truly belong, outsiders need not just permission to be-
long, but also a means of belonging. The Lost Promise gives us a 
good foundation for imagining the content of those rights of be-
longing. The book also reminds us that rights of belonging have 
more than one doctrinal basis. Because of its promise of both ra-
cial equality and economic empowerment, the Thirteenth 
Amendment is a crucial source of rights of belonging. Finally. 
because rights of belonging are positive rights, they must come 
primarily from positive law. In the twenty-first century, we 
should expect legislatures, not the courts. to play the leading role 
in establishing and protecting rights of belonging. 
The Lost Promise teaches us three lessons about rights of 
belonging. First, those rights must include economic rights as 
well as anti-discrimination norms. Second. those rights come not 
just from the Fourteenth Amendment, which has been so limited 
by the Supreme Court, but also from the as yet untapped poten-
tial of the Thirteenth Amendment, which establishes both the 
right to racial equality and the end of the economic subordina-
tion of workers. Finally, as positive rights, rights of belonging are 
best suited to enforcement not by the federal courts. but by the 
political branches. Thus, the conceptualization of rights of be-
longing must occur not within the confines of federal litigation. 
but instead as the result of a robust political debate. 
First, in order to truly facilitate the belonging of outsiders in 
our society, rights of belonging include economic rights as well 
as anti-discrimination rights. This is not a new insight. Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King. Jr., took his last fateful trip to Memphis in sup-
port of sanitation workers who were on strike in order to achieve 
the right to form a union and to earn a living wage. The slogan 
on the signs that those workers carried, "I am a man," reflected 
their belief that they were fighting not just for economic rights 
but for dignity and respect. The sanitation workers in Memphis 
understood that in order to belong to their community as equal 
citizens. they needed the economic empowerment that a right to 
join a union would bring to them. 
Goluboff reminds us that the right to join a union was once 
considered a fundamental human right, the most important of all 
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"civil rights," not just by labor leaders, but also by the general 
public. In the decades leading up to the passage of the National 
Labor Relations Act, workers fought, suffered, and even died for 
the right to form unions.64 The right to organize into a union is a 
fundamental right of belonging. It facilitates not only the eco-
nomic empowerment of workers, but also their political empow-
erment. 
However, unions were a mixed blessing for African Ameri-
cans during the 1940s and 1950s. Some unions welcomed Blacks 
with open arms and launched the careers of civil rights leaders 
such as A. Philip Randolph."' Other unions discriminated against 
African Americans (pp. 96-100). Many unions were segregated, 
and union leaders often did their best to keep African Ameri-
cans away from the better skilled, better paying jobs (p. 95). 
Even when they were allowed to be members, Blacks often 
lacked meaningful representation in their unions. This situation 
often put Black workers in the uncomfortable position of oppos-
ing unions, suing them for race discrimination, where such a 
remedy was available."" As a remedy, the NLRB and some state 
courts ordered employers to reinstate Black workers even if they 
could not be union members (p. 212). 
Over time, relationships between unions and people of 
color have improved. By the late 1940s, the NAACP had allied 
itself with unions and stopped litigating labor cases. including 
discrimination cases against unions (p. 222). During the next 
decade the NAACP and leading unions cemented their alliances. 
UA W leader Walter Reuther helped to lead the fight for the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, and union support was essential to its pas-
sage."7 In the early twenty-first century, some of the most vibrant 
unions, such as UNITE, have large minority memberships."H Un-
ion membership also continues to be one of the most important 
sources of empowerment for low-income people, including jani-
64. See, e.g .. Zietlow & Pope. The Alllo-Lite Strike. supra note 42. 
65. See Martha Biondi. TO STAND AND FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
IN POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY 17 (2003). 
66. Federal agencies were prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race. 
though some openly discriminated. In 1935. the NAACP supported an amendment to the 
NLRA that would have prohibited unions from discriminating on the basis of race. but 
the amendment failed. In its suits against unions. the NAACP relied upon state laws in-
cluding the New York Fair Employment Practices Act. and the federal Railwav labors 
Act (p. 195). -
67. See Rebecca Zietlow. To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts and the 1964 
Civil Rights Act. 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945 (2005). 
68. http://www.unitehere.org/presscenter/factsheet.php. 
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tors and service employees. Union membership has declined 
dramatically since its height in the mid-1950s,fi9 due in large part 
to Supreme Court rulings narrowly interpreting the National 
Labor Relations Act.70 The NLRA should be amended to 
strengthen its protections for the workers' right to organize. 
To determine what other economic rights are rights of be-
longing, a good starting place is the era that Goluboff describes 
in her book. At the beginning of his fourth term as president, 
Franklin Roosevelt proposed a "Second Bill of Rights," which 
included the right to a job at an adequate wage, decent housing, 
medical care, and education (p. 35). Roosevelt's Bill of Rights 
would have established an affirmative obligation on the part of 
the government to provide for its citizens. As Roosevelt's suc-
cessor, President Harry Truman explained in a 1947 speech at 
the Lincoln Memorial, "The extension of civil rights today 
means not protection of the people against the Government, but 
protection of the people by the Government" (p. 141).71 Initially, 
Roosevelt's proposal was well received. The elite American Law 
Institute convened an international committee to write up "the 
essential statement of human rights" which "emphasized that 
economic rights were a necessary part of any modern state," and 
the United Nations, which was formed in 1945, adopted similar 
guarantees (p. 141). Congress considered a Full Employment 
Bill in 1945, which would have created a right of "all Americans" 
to "useful, remunerative, regular, and fulltime employment" and 
obliged the federal government to vindicate that right (p. 141). 
After World War II ended, the political tide turned to the 
right, anti-Communism flourished, and the Full Employment 
Act failed (p. 39). However, Roosevelt's initiative still serves as a 
foundation for other economic rights of belonging. While it is 
difficult to imagine the government guaranteeing a right to em-
ployment or housing, polls show that a majority of Americans 
already believe that education and access to health care are fun-
damental rights. Because education and health care are so essen-
tial to economic advancement, and even survival, they fit within 
69. In 2007. 12.1 percent of employed wage and salary workers were members of 
unions. In 1983. the number was 20.1 percent. See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Press Release. USDL 08-0092. January 25. 2008. http://www.bls.gov/ 
news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. 
70. See James Gray Pope. How Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales. 
103 MICH. L. REV. 518 (2004). 
71. For an in-depth discussion of the CRS vision of the role of government in pro-
tecting civil rights under Truman, see ROBERT K. CARR. FEDERAL PROTECTION OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD ( 1947). 
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the rubric of twenty-first century rights of belonging. Like Roo-
sevelt's Second Bill of Rights, these rights would create a posi-
tive obligation by the government.72 
The Lost Promise also reminds us that there is more than 
one doctrinal basis for civil rights. Under the Brown paradigm, 
the equal protection clause dominated anti-discrimination law in 
the second half of the twentieth century. Apart from the years of 
the CRS, and despite its wide-ranging promise, the Thirteenth 
Amendment has been an under-enforced and under-appreciated 
constitutional provision. Recently, however, there has been a 
surge of scholarly interest in that amendment. 73 Members of 
Congress also have revived the Thirteenth Amendment en-
forcement power by enacting the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 200074 and relying on it as a foundation of a proposed 
Hate Crimes Act. 75 Despite its recent rulings narrowly construing 
the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, the United 
States Supreme Court continues to construe the Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power broadly.7" The twenty-first cen-
tury may well be the century of the Thirteenth Amendment. For 
those who wish to address the intersection of race and class in 
our society, it is the fountainhead of constitutional law. 
The Thirteenth Amendment has several advantages over 
the Fourteenth as a source of civil rights remedies. First, unlike 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment's 
scope is not limited to state action. On its face, the Thirteenth 
Amendment applies to private action, and the Court has inter-
72. Therefore. for reasons explained below. they are best suited for enforcement by 
Congress. not the federal courts. 
73. See, e.g.. ALEXANDER TSESIS. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY (2004): Pope. Thirteenth Amendment versus 
the Commerce Clause. supra note 59. 
74. See Peonage. Slavery and Trafficking in Persons Act. 18 U.S.C. §1581 (June 25, 
1948. c. 645,62 Stat. 772: Sept. 13. 1994. Pub. L. 103-322. Title XXXIII. §33016(1)(K). 108 
Stat. 2147: Sept. 30. 1996. Pub. L. 104-208, Div. C. Title II. §218(a), 110 Stat. 3009-573: 
Oct. 28.2000. Pub. L. 106-386. Div. A. §112(a)(1). 114 Stat. 1486). 
75. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592. The 
Act passed the House of Representatives and was referred to the Senate Committee on 
May 7. 2007. H.R. 110-113. Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a similar provision on 
the Senate side. S. 1105. the Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act of 2007. S. 4445-4447. 
76. The most recent example is a case this term in which the Supreme Court held 
that Section 1981. a provision of the 1866 Civil Rights Act prohibiting race discrimination 
in contracts based on the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. authorized a rem-
edy for retaliatory actions on the part of employers. See CBOCS. Inc. v. Humphries. 128 
S. Ct. 1951 (2008). 
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preted it that way on numerous occasions. 77 Second, the Thir-
teenth Amendment prohibits any badges or incidents of slavery 
based on race, so it is an excellent source of anti-race-
discrimination law. Third, the Amendment is also a potent 
source of workers' rights, because it provides protection against 
the economic exploitation of workers. Thus, the Thirteenth 
Amendment provides a source of anti-subordination law without 
triggering the awkward equality/difference dilemma posed by 
the equal protection clause. 
Finally, The Lost Promise highlights the key role that the 
political branches play in defining and enforcing rights of be-
longing. Under the Brown paradigm, courts do the work of cre-
ating civil rights, protecting minorities against the discrimination 
of the majority.7" The Lost Promise reminds us how important it 
is for supporters of civil rights to engage the political process as 
well. President Roosevelt created the CRS and the CRS enjoyed 
strong support from his Attorneys General, Murphy and Biddle. 
Roosevelt's successor, President Harry Truman, also strongly 
supported its efforts (pp. 38-40). CRS lawyers pursued a litiga-
tion strategy that was complementary to the efforts of members 
of Congress to expand the rights of workers. At the request of 
the CRS, Congress amended the Anti-Peonage Act in 1948 to 
strengthen its provisions and expand the meaning of involuntary 
servitude (p. 150). The CRS and the NAACP both lobbied regu-
larly for federal legislation expanding civil rights. In the twenty-
first century, re-imagining civil rights as rights of belonging must 
happen within the political process, not the confines of the U.S. 
courts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Risa Goluboff's The Lost Promise of Civil Rights teaches us 
a great deal about the roots of our modern civil rights tradition. 
Goluboff tells us what lawyers thought during those formative 
years, and she details the decisions they made that shaped the 
civil rights paradigm today. But most importantly, in The Lost 
Promise, Goluboff gives us a sense of where to go tomorrow. 
This provocative book was intended to open our eyes and make 
77. See, e.g .. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co .. 392 U.S. 409 (1968): Runyon v. 
McCrary. 427 U.S. 160. 172 (1976): Patterson v. McClean Credit Union. 491 U.S. 164 
(1989). 
78. See Michael J. Klarman. Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolu-
tions. 82 Y A. L. REV. I ( 1996 ). 
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us question the paradigm that shapes the way that civil rights 
lawyers practice and the way that constitutional law scholars 
think about equality rights. Goluboff has triggered a crucial con-
versation about the future of civil rights. and a foundation for re-
envisioning those rights as rights of belonging. Let us hope that 
the conversation continues. 
